Previously only TOTP-enabled triggered an email. Every other
security-relevant change — password change, TOTP disable, passkey
add/remove, API key create/revoke, email address change, backup-code
regeneration — happened silently, so an attacker on a stolen session
could quietly drop 2FA or hijack the email with no signal to the
account holder.
Add SecurityMailer with one method per event. Each email carries the
request IP, user-agent, and timestamp so the user can spot unfamiliar
activity. Email-address changes notify both the old and new addresses
with directional language; the old-address copy explicitly warns that
whoever made the change can now receive password reset emails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the changelog-flavored "view no longer round-trips" line with a
one-liner naming the actual threat (session-holder substituting a secret
they control). Drop the narration comment above session.delete +
deliver_later -- the identifiers already say what the two lines do.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TOTP enrollment previously round-tripped the generated secret through a
hidden form field and saved whatever the client submitted, letting an
attacker with session access enroll a 2FA device they control by posting
their own secret plus a matching code. Stash the secret in the session
at GET /totp/new, read it only from the session at POST /totp, and drop
the hidden field from the view. Notify the user by email on successful
enrollment so unauthorized activations are visible even if a new vector
appears later.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 <noreply@anthropic.com>
