24266872f9
revoke_family! revoked only the refresh tokens in a rotation family. When reuse of a revoked refresh token was detected (a token-theft signal), the access tokens issued across that chain stayed valid at /userinfo until expiry — up to the access-token TTL — so an attacker holding a stolen access token kept access. revoke_family! now also revokes every access token referenced by the family's refresh tokens. Adds a regression test: rotate once, reuse the revoked token, and assert both the original and rotated-in access tokens are revoked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
89 lines
2.6 KiB
Ruby
89 lines
2.6 KiB
Ruby
class OidcRefreshToken < ApplicationRecord
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belongs_to :application
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belongs_to :user
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belongs_to :oidc_access_token
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belongs_to :oidc_authorization_code, optional: true
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before_validation :generate_token, on: :create
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before_validation :set_expiry, on: :create
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before_validation :set_token_family_id, on: :create
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validates :token_hmac, presence: true, uniqueness: true
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scope :valid, -> { where("expires_at > ?", Time.current).where(revoked_at: nil) }
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scope :expired, -> { where("expires_at <= ?", Time.current) }
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scope :revoked, -> { where.not(revoked_at: nil) }
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scope :active, -> { valid }
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# For token rotation detection (prevents reuse attacks)
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scope :in_family, ->(family_id) { where(token_family_id: family_id) }
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attr_accessor :token # Store plaintext token temporarily for returning to client
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# Find refresh token by plaintext token using HMAC verification
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def self.find_by_token(plaintext_token)
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return nil if plaintext_token.blank?
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token_hmac = compute_token_hmac(plaintext_token)
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find_by(token_hmac: token_hmac)
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end
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# Compute HMAC for token lookup
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def self.compute_token_hmac(plaintext_token)
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OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest("SHA256", TokenHmac::KEY, plaintext_token)
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end
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def expired?
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expires_at <= Time.current
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end
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def revoked?
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revoked_at.present?
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end
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def active?
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!expired? && !revoked?
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end
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def revoke!
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update!(revoked_at: Time.current)
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end
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# Revoke all refresh tokens in the same family (token rotation security).
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# Also revoke every access token issued within the family: on a detected reuse
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# attack the stolen chain's access tokens must not remain usable at /userinfo
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# until they expire.
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def revoke_family!
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return unless token_family_id.present?
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now = Time.current
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family = OidcRefreshToken.in_family(token_family_id)
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access_token_ids = family.pluck(:oidc_access_token_id).compact.uniq
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family.update_all(revoked_at: now)
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if access_token_ids.any?
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OidcAccessToken.where(id: access_token_ids, revoked_at: nil).update_all(revoked_at: now)
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end
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end
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private
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def generate_token
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# Generate random plaintext token
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self.token ||= SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(48)
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# Store HMAC in database (not plaintext)
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self.token_hmac ||= self.class.compute_token_hmac(token)
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end
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def set_expiry
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# Use application's configured refresh token TTL
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self.expires_at ||= application.refresh_token_expiry
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end
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def set_token_family_id
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# Use a random ID to group tokens in the same rotation chain
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# This helps detect token reuse attacks
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self.token_family_id ||= SecureRandom.random_number(2**31)
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end
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end
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