clinch/docs/forward-auth.md

Forward Authentication

Overview

Forward authentication allows a reverse proxy (like Caddy, Nginx, Traefik) to delegate authentication decisions to a separate service. Clinch implements this pattern to provide SSO for multiple applications.

Key Implementation Details

Tip 1: Forward URL Configuration ✅

Clinch includes the original destination URL in the redirect parameters:

login_params = {
  rd: original_url,    # redirect destination
  rm: request.method   # request method
}
login_url = "#{base_url}/signin?#{login_params.to_query}"

Example: https://clinch.example.com/signin?rd=https://metube.example.com/&rm=GET

Tip 2: Root Domain Cookies ✅

Clinch sets authentication cookies on the root domain to enable cross-subdomain authentication:

def extract_root_domain(host)
  # clinch.example.com -> .example.com
  # app.example.co.uk -> .example.co.uk
  # localhost -> nil (no domain restriction)
end

cookies.signed.permanent[:session_id] = {
  value: session.id,
  httponly: true,
  same_site: :lax,
  secure: Rails.env.production?,
  domain: ".example.com"  # Available to all subdomains
}

This allows the same session cookie to work across:

• clinch.example.com (auth service)
• metube.example.com (protected app)
• sonarr.example.com (protected app)

Tip 3: Race Condition Solution with One-Time Tokens ✅

Problem: After successful authentication, there's a race condition where the browser immediately follows the redirect to the protected application, but the reverse proxy makes a forward auth request before the browser has processed and started sending the new session cookie.

Solution: Clinch uses a one-time token system to bridge this timing gap:

# During authentication (authentication.rb)
def create_forward_auth_token(session_obj)
  token = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(32)

  # Store token for 30 seconds
  Rails.cache.write("forward_auth_token:#{token}", session_obj.id, expires_in: 30.seconds)

  # Add token to redirect URL
  if session[:return_to_after_authenticating].present?
    original_url = session[:return_to_after_authenticating]
    uri = URI.parse(original_url)
    query_params = URI.decode_www_form(uri.query || "").to_h
    query_params['fa_token'] = token
    uri.query = URI.encode_www_form(query_params)
    session[:return_to_after_authenticating] = uri.to_s
  end
end

# In forward auth verification (forward_auth_controller.rb)
def check_forward_auth_token
  token = params[:fa_token]
  return nil unless token.present?

  session_id = Rails.cache.read("forward_auth_token:#{token}")
  return nil unless session_id

  session = Session.find_by(id: session_id)
  return nil unless session && !session.expired?

  # Delete token immediately (one-time use)
  Rails.cache.delete("forward_auth_token:#{token}")

  Rails.logger.info "ForwardAuth: Valid one-time token used for session #{session_id}"
  session_id
end

How it works:

1. User authenticates → Rails sets session cookie + generates one-time token
2. Token gets appended to redirect URL: https://metube.example.com/?fa_token=abc123...
3. Browser follows redirect → Caddy makes forward auth request with token
4. Forward auth validates token → authenticates user immediately
5. Token is deleted (one-time use) → subsequent requests use normal cookies

Security Features:

• Tokens expire after 30 seconds
• One-time use (deleted after validation)
• Secure random generation
• Session validation before token acceptance

Authelia Analysis

Implementation Comparison

Authelia Approach (from analysis of tmp/authelia/):

• Returns 302 Found or 303 See Other with Location header
• Direct browser redirects (bypasses some proxy logic)
• Uses StatusFound (302) or StatusSeeOther (303)

Clinch Current Implementation:

• Returns 302 Found directly to login URL (matching Authelia)
• Includes rd (redirect destination) and rm (request method) parameters
• Uses root domain cookies for cross-subdomain authentication

How Clinch Forward Auth Works

Authentication Flow

1. User visits https://metube.example.com/
2. Caddy forwards to http://clinch:9000/api/verify?rd=https://clinch.example.com
3. Clinch checks session:
   • If authenticated: Returns 200 OK with user headers
   • If not authenticated: Returns 302 Found to login URL with redirect parameters
4. Browser follows redirect to Clinch login page
5. User logs in (with TOTP if enabled):
   • Rails creates session and sets cross-domain cookie
   • Rails generates one-time token and appends to redirect URL
   • User is redirected to: https://metube.example.com/?fa_token=abc123...
6. Browser follows redirect → Caddy makes forward auth request with token
7. Clinch validates one-time token → authenticates user immediately
8. Token is deleted → subsequent requests use normal session cookies
9. Caddy forwards to MEtube with proper authentication headers

Response Headers

Successful Authentication (200 OK):

Remote-User: user@example.com
Remote-Email: user@example.com
Remote-Groups: media-managers,users
Remote-Admin: false

Redirect to Login (302 Found):

Location: https://clinch.example.com/signin?rd=https://metube.example.com/&rm=GET

Caddy Configuration

# Clinch SSO (main authentication server)
clinch.example.com {
    reverse_proxy clinch:9000
}

# MEtube (protected by Clinch)
metube.example.com {
    forward_auth clinch:9000 {
        uri /api/verify?rd=https://clinch.example.com
        copy_headers Remote-User Remote-Email Remote-Groups Remote-Admin
    }

    handle {
        reverse_proxy * {
            to http://192.168.2.223:8081
            header_up X-Real-IP {remote_host}
        }
    }
}

Key Files

• Forward Auth Controller: app/controllers/api/forward_auth_controller.rb
• Authentication Logic: app/controllers/concerns/authentication.rb
• Caddy Examples: docs/caddy-example.md
• Authelia Analysis: docs/authelia-forward-auth.md

Testing

# Test forward auth endpoint directly
curl -v http://localhost:9000/api/verify?rd=https://clinch.example.com

# Should return 302 redirect to login page
# Or 200 OK if you have a valid session cookie

Security Considerations

Content Security Policy (CSP)

Clinch includes a comprehensive Content Security Policy to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks by controlling which resources can be loaded by the browser.

What CSP Prevents:

• Malicious script injection attacks
• Unauthorized resource loading
• Clickjacking through iframe protection
• Data exfiltration through unauthorized connections

CSP Features:

• Strict script control: Only allows scripts from same origin or HTTPS
• Nonce support: Allows specific inline scripts with cryptographic nonces
• Frame protection: Prevents clickjacking attacks
• Resource restrictions: Controls images, fonts, styles, and media sources
• Violation reporting: Monitors and logs attempted XSS attacks

Development vs Production:

• Development: Report-only mode for debugging CSP violations
• Production: Full enforcement with violation logging

DNS Rebinding Protection

Clinch includes built-in DNS rebinding protection for enhanced security in all deployment scenarios.

What is DNS Rebinding? DNS rebinding attacks trick a victim's browser into accessing internal network resources by manipulating DNS responses, potentially allowing attackers to probe your authentication system.

Clinch's Protection Layers:

1. Rails Host Validation: Blocks unauthorized domains at the application level
2. Infrastructure Security: Caddy/Reverse proxy provides additional protection
3. Environment-Specific Configuration: Adapts to your deployment scenario

Deployment Scenarios

Scenario 1: Same Docker Compose (Recommended)

# docker-compose.yml
services:
  caddy:
    # ... caddy configuration

  clinch:
    image: reg.tbdb.info/clinch:latest
    environment:
      - CLINCH_HOST=auth.aapamilne.com
      - CLINCH_DOCKER_SERVICE_NAME=clinch  # Enable service name access
      - CLINCH_ALLOW_INTERNAL_IPS=true     # Allow backup IP access
      - CLINCH_ALLOW_LOCALHOST=false

Caddy Configuration:

metube.aapamilne.com {
    forward_auth clinch:3000 {  # Docker service name (preferred)
        uri /api/verify
        copy_headers Remote-User Remote-Email Remote-Groups Remote-Admin
    }

    handle {
        reverse_proxy * {
            to http://192.168.2.223:8081
        }
    }
}

Security Benefits:

• ✅ Docker network isolation prevents external access
• ✅ Service names resolve to unpredictable internal IPs
• ✅ Natural DNS rebinding protection
• ✅ Application-level host validation as backup

Scenario 2: Separate Docker Composes (Current Setup)

# clinch-compose/.env
CLINCH_HOST=auth.aapamilne.com
CLINCH_ALLOW_INTERNAL_IPS=true
CLINCH_ALLOW_LOCALHOST=false
CLINCH_DOCKER_SERVICE_NAME=

Caddy Configuration:

metube.aapamilne.com {
    forward_auth 192.168.2.246:3000 {  # IP access across composes
        uri /api/verify
        copy_headers Remote-User Remote-Email Remote-Groups Remote-Admin
    }
}

Security Benefits:

• ✅ Rails host validation blocks unauthorized domains
• ✅ Only allows private IP ranges and your domain
• ✅ Defense in depth (application + infrastructure security)

Scenario 3: External Deployment

# Production environment
environment:
  - CLINCH_HOST=auth.example.com
  - CLINCH_ALLOW_INTERNAL_IPS=false  # Stricter for external
  - CLINCH_ALLOW_LOCALHOST=false

Caddy Configuration:

app.example.com {
    forward_auth auth.example.com:3000 {  # External domain only
        uri /api/verify
        copy_headers Remote-User Remote-Email Remote-Groups Remote-Admin
    }
}

Security Benefits:

• ✅ Only allows your external domain
• ✅ Blocks internal IP access
• ✅ Maximum security for public deployments

Host Validation Environment Variables

Variable	Default	Purpose	Recommended Setting
CLINCH_HOST	auth.aapamilne.com	Primary domain	Always set to your auth domain
CLINCH_DOCKER_SERVICE_NAME	nil	Docker service name	Set to service name in same compose
CLINCH_ALLOW_INTERNAL_IPS	true	Allow private IPs	true for internal, false for external
CLINCH_ALLOW_LOCALHOST	false	Allow localhost access	true for development only

Security Architecture

Clinch provides defense in depth security with multiple protection layers:

Application-Level Security:

• Host validation prevents unauthorized domain access
• Session-based authentication with secure cookies
• Rate limiting on sensitive endpoints
• Input validation and sanitization
• Content Security Policy (CSP) prevents XSS attacks

Infrastructure Security:

• Docker network isolation
• Reverse proxy access control
• SSL/TLS encryption
• Private network restrictions

Benefits of Multi-Layer Security:

• If infrastructure security fails, application security still protects
• Flexible deployment options without compromising security
• Environment-specific configuration for different threat models

Troubleshooting

Common Issues

1. Authentication Loop: Check that cookies are set on the root domain
2. Session Not Shared: Verify extract_root_domain is working correctly
3. Caddy Connection: Ensure service name/IP resolves from your Caddy container
4. Race Condition After Authentication:
   • Problem: Forward auth fails immediately after login due to cookie timing
   • Solution: One-time tokens automatically bridge this gap
   • Debug: Look for "ForwardAuth: Valid one-time token used" in logs
5. Host Validation Errors:
   • Problem: "Blocked host: [host]" errors in logs
   • Solution: Check CLINCH_HOST and other environment variables
   • Debug: Verify your Caddy configuration matches allowed hosts
6. DNS Rebinding Protection:
   • Problem: Legitimate requests blocked as "unauthorized host"
   • Solution: Ensure your deployment scenario matches environment variables
   • Debug: Check Rails logs for host validation messages

Debug Logging

Enable debug logging in forward_auth_controller.rb to see:

• Headers received from Caddy
• Domain extraction results
• Redirect URLs being generated
• Token validation during race condition resolution

Rails.logger.info "ForwardAuth Headers: Host=#{host}, X-Forwarded-Host=#{original_host}"
Rails.logger.info "Setting 302 redirect to: #{login_url}"
Rails.logger.info "ForwardAuth: Valid one-time token used for session #{session_id}"
Rails.logger.info "Authentication: Added forward auth token to redirect URL: #{url}"

Key log messages to watch for:

• "Authentication: Added forward auth token to redirect URL" - Token generation during login
• "ForwardAuth: Valid one-time token used for session X" - Successful race condition resolution
• "ForwardAuth: Session cookie present: false" - Cookie timing issue (should be resolved by token)

Other References

• https://www.reddit.com/r/selfhosted/comments/1hybe81/i_wanted_to_implement_my_own_forward_auth_proxy/
• https://www.kevinsimper.dk/posts/implementing-a-forward_auth-proxy-tips-and-details